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Abstract
Some commentators have claimed that there is a growing Beijing Consensus among
emerging and developing economies concerning the merits of China’s economic policies.
Within an analytical framework provided by the well known international trilemma,
this paper investigates the empirical evidence concerning this claim with speciﬁc ref-
erence to the adoption of international macroeconomic policies. We document China’s
high degree of exchange rate stability and monetary independence and low degree of
ﬁnancial openness. We then ﬁnd that there are substantial diﬀerences between what
China does and what is done in other emerging and developing economies. While we
discover some regional and inter-temporal variations, there seems to be little or no
support for the existence of a Beijing Consensus on international macroeconomic pol-
icy. The proximity of China’s policies to those in the rest of the developing world may
increase in the future; but this is may reﬂect changes in China rather than elsewhere.
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per@scu.edu.1 Introduction
In his 2004 paper, Joshua Cooper Ramo suggested that there was a ‘Beijing Consen-
sus’ throughout the developing world. He argued that the consensus was forming around
certain basic guidelines for encouraging economic development modeled on experience
in China (Ramo, 2004). However, although the term has been fairly widely used, it
has remained ill-deﬁned. Certainly it lacks the greater precision that was used by John
Williamson when he introduced the concept of the Washington Consensus. Indeed, Williamson
has commented that the Beijing Consensus is in essence simply a perception by those out-
side China of ‘what China does’ (Williamson, 2010).
With such imprecision it is diﬃcult to reach any rigorous and meaningful evaluation of
whether there is or is not a consensus amongst developing economies about an appropriate
development strategy based on the path adopted by China. To test the validity of the
implementation of a Beijing Consensus in these terms would require a detailed and speciﬁc
deﬁnition of China’s economic policies as well as its political regime, the identiﬁcation of
metrics by which these characteristics can be objectively measured, the collection of data
across the developing world relating to these metrics, and the selection of a methodology
that captures the proximity of other countries’ policies to those adopted in China. We do
not undertake such a mammoth exercise in this paper. Instead our ambitions are more
limited and modest.
Our focus is on the combination of international macroeconomic policies adopted by
emerging and developing countries. Our analytical framework is provided by the well
known trilemma or impossible triad, that argues that countries cannot simultaneously have
pegged exchange rates, monetary independence and free capital mobility.1 The trilemma
forces countries to adopt a combination of these characteristics that is consistent with the
constraints it imposes. They will emerge with an outcome which lies somewhere within
what is, in eﬀect, a three dimensional policy space. Thus, one outcome may encompass, for
example, only a small degree of exchange rate ﬂexibility, a substantial degree of monetary
independence and the use of some capital controls, while another may involve much greater
exchange rate ﬂexibility and the free mobility of capital. The detailed possibilities are, in
principle, inﬁnite.
The methodology we use in the paper allows us to identify the location of economies
1within the three dimensional policy space just described. We ﬁrst summarise the observed
outcome in China. Having established China’s outcome, we then estimate the proximity
of other emerging and developing economies to this. Do developing countries tend to
cluster around what China does or do they deviate from it? Beyond this, do any patterns
emerge, with some speciﬁc types of developing countries (in terms of regional location
or level of development) showing a greater proximity to China than others, and has the
degree of proximity changed over time? Our objective in the paper is therefore to test an
element of the Beijing Consensus in terms of the realized combinations of international
macroeconomic policies adopted by developing and emerging economies.
The paper is organised in the following way. Section 2 provides a further broad but
brief discussion of the Beijing Consensus and summarises the particular interpretation
of it that we use for the purposes of our analysis. Section 3 presents, again brieﬂy, our
analytical approach, informed by the impossible triad. Section 4 explains our empirical
methodology and reports our ﬁndings. Finally Section 5, provides a succinct summary
and makes a few concluding remarks about the possible evolution of trilemma outcomes
for China, in the light of experience in more advanced economies.
2 From Washington to Beijing
In the early 1990s, John Williamson claimed that there was a Washington Consensus
concerning the design of economic policy. His particular focus was on Latin America
and the policies that were being advocated there by the Washington-based international
ﬁnancial institutions; the IMF and the World Bank. Although the phrase has come to
be used in diﬀerent ways by diﬀerent people, and often in a way that is at odds with
Williamson’s initial presentation of it, the Washington Consensus is seen as encompassing
macroeconomic policies relating to ﬁscal deﬁcits, monetary expansion and exchange rate
policy; microeconomic policy relating to competition policy and the regulation of mar-
kets; and policies relating to trade and capital market openness. Key elements involve
monetary discipline; tax reform to widen the tax base and increase tax revenue; tight
control of public expenditure, with a redirection of it towards areas such as health and
education; ﬁnancial liberalization designed to encourage domestic saving and to raise the
marginal eﬃciency of investment; the elimination of overvalued exchange rates in order to
2strengthen the current account of the balance of payments and discourage capital ﬂight;
trade liberalization designed with the objective of raising domestic economic eﬃciency and
exploiting comparative advantage; encouragement of foreign direct investment as a means
of facilitating technology transfer; privatization and deregulation as ways of overcoming
the ineﬃciencies of state monopolies and increasing competition; and the establishment
of systems of property rights in order to facilitate the better operation of markets.
In the period since its inception, many claims and counter-claims have been made
about the extent to which the Washington Consensus has survived, with assessments
often depending on the particular deﬁnition favored. A key emerging claim is that in
the developing world the Washington Consensus has been replaced by a so-called Beijing
Consensus. However, if there were ambiguities in the interpretation of the Washington
Consensus, there have been even greater degrees of imprecision about the components of
the Beijing Consensus. At the broadest and most inclusive level the Beijing Consensus has
been used to describe a situation in which emerging and developing economies have sought
to imitate the economic policies pursued in China. At this level, the Beijing Consensus
covers the complete array of economic policy and is therefore very comprehensive. More
narrowly, the Beijing Consensus is taken to describe the adoption of a development strategy
that is built around a gradual move to market liberalization. In this context, it relates
more to a ‘process’ than to a particular combination of policies, and a belief that the
gradualist approach to economic reform adopted in China is superior to the ‘big bang’ or
‘shock therapy’ approach that has been followed in some other countries in transition.
The ‘content’ and ‘process’ of the Beijing Consensus can, however, be combined. For
example, part of the content may be to move towards a ﬂexible exchange rate, but the
process may be to do this only very gradually by incrementally or occasionally incorporat-
ing a greater degree of ﬂexibility. Similarly, part of the content may be to move towards
capital account liberalization but with a process that sets out to achieve this in a rather
slow and piecemeal fashion. The same observations could be made about the adoption of
free markets in general, and even about the democratization of the political system. At
any one time, the content of policy may not reﬂect the ﬁnal objective that has been set
by those in authority since the process may be incomplete. However, with a suﬃciently
slow acting process of reform, it may appear that the existing status quo is fairly ﬁrmly
3entrenched.
Whatever the claims made by policy makers in China about their intentions, there may
be suﬃciently little policy action in this direction to allow the dynamics of policy change
to be detected. This allows the particular conﬁguration of policy at any one point in time
to be presented as ‘what China does’. The idea behind the Beijing Consensus is that a
similar policy conﬁguration is to be found across emerging and developing countries.
The existing policy mix in China is certainly inconsistent with key facets of the Wash-
ington Consensus. While there might be legitimate debate about whether the design of
China’s domestic monetary policy and ﬁscal policy is consistent with the Washington Con-
sensus, there would be considerably less disagreement about China’s exchange rate policy
and the openness of China’s capital account. Even though the Washington Consensus does
not directly opt for the superiority of ﬂexible exchange rates, it does advocate avoiding
currency misalignment, implying that some degree of exchange rate adjustment may be
needed to correct currency overvaluation or undervaluation. Similarly, while not eschew-
ing the use of capital controls in some circumstances, the Washington Consensus favors a
move towards capital account liberalization. There is signiﬁcant evidence to support the
claim that China has strongly intervened in the foreign exchange market to maintain a
low value for the renmimbi (RMB), with the motivation for this being to stimulate export
led economic growth. Correspondingly, China has made extensive use of capital controls,
with these allowing the Chinese authorities to exercise control over the value of the RMB.
If there is a Beijing Consensus, it would be expected that other emerging economies
and developing countries would be found to have adopted similar policies. The empirical
section of this paper explores the extent to which they have. Before moving on to this,
however, we ﬁrst characterize the aspects of what China does. Speciﬁcally, in the next
section, we brieﬂy characterize China’s extant policies in the context of the impossible
trinity that underlies international macroeconomic policy.
3 An Analytical Framework
The impossible triad or trilemma claims that countries cannot simultaneously have ﬁxed
exchange rates, monetary independence and free capital mobility. If a country’s authorities
opt to peg the value of the currency, then either domestic monetary policy needs to be
4designed to ensure that the domestic rate of interest is close to the global rate in order to
remove the incentive for capital to move internationally, or capital controls will be needed
to directly prevent or moderate the inﬂow and outﬂow of international capital. If a high
priority is placed on monetary independence but also on capital mobility, then the message
of the trilemma is that a pegged exchange rate will be unsustainable. The trilemma thereby
imposes constraints on the design of international macroeconomic policy, and delineates
an area of a three-dimensional policy space incorporating exchange rate stability, ﬁnancial
openness and monetary independence. Of course, countries may not opt for the extremities
within this space, and it is perhaps likely that they will not. There are degrees of currency
ﬂexibility. Capital controls can be extensive or minimal. And the domestic rate of interest
may deviate a lot or only a little from the global rate. If, as the above discussion suggests,
China has opted for a pegged exchange rate with respect to the US dollar, as well as for
monetary independence, then it also follows from the trilemma that capital controls would
have been in place.
The trilemma also implies a particular pattern of change in terms of the design of
international macroeconomic policy. For example, a move towards capital account liber-
alization will coincide with either the introduction of a greater degree of exchange rate
ﬂexibility or a less strong commitment to monetary independence.
In the context of the trilemma, a number of ‘archetypes’ have been suggested to rep-
resent the extremes in the feasible policy space. In this framework, the ‘U.S.’ archetype
represents the point where monetary autonomy and capital market openness are com-
plete. A ‘Hong Kong’ archetype represents a point with complete exchange rate stability
and capital market openness; while the ‘China’ archetype represents complete exchange
rate stability, a closed ﬁnancial system, and monetary independence. Our ﬁrst empirical
challenge is to assess the accuracy of the China archetype by identifying China’s actual
location in the three dimensional policy space delineated by the trilemma. Having estab-
lished the trilemma outcome for China, we then seek to test the extent to which a Beijing
Consensus exists on international macroeconomic policy by examining the proximity of
other emerging and developing economies to China. Does the developing world mimic
China?
54 A Comparison of International Macroeconomic Policy Out-
comes
4.1 Data and Methodology
In this section we set out to provide a description of the international macroeconomic
policies implemented by China in the last 25 years and examine whether other developing
and emerging economies have implemented similar international macroeconomic policies
in a similar way. In the context of the trilemma, outlined in the previous section, our
focus is on policies related to exchange rate stability (s), ﬁnancial account openness (f)
and monetary sovereignty (m).
Our exchange rate stability measure is that used in Aizenman et al. (2010). It takes
values between zero and one, with higher values indicating higher stability against the





where σ is the annual standard deviation of the monthly change in the exchange rate
∆log(e). If the monthly exchange rate change is less than ±0.33, then a value of one is
imposed. (This prevents overstating ﬂexibility when exchange rate policy targets a narrow
band.) For more details see Aizenman et al. (2010).
As our ﬁnancial account openness variable, we use Chinn and Ito’s (2006) updated
ﬁnancial openness measure. The construction of the measure, which they call KAOPEN,
takes into account four binary variables reported in the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions. These are: the presence of multiple exchange
rates; restrictions on current account transactions; restrictions on capital account transac-
tions; and the treatment of export proceeds. Higher values of this index indicate greater
ﬁnancial account openness. We normalize their measure to fall between zero and one. For
more details see Chinn and Ito (2006).
To derive a measure of monetary policy sovereignty we conjecture that the trilemma
constraint holds and that the trade-oﬀs among the polices are linear.2 With the exchange
rate stability and ﬁnancial openness measures being constrained in [0,1] and with countries
6being unable to pursue all three policies simultaneously, a linear trade-oﬀ implies that
m =2− s − f.3 We use this residual measure that derives directly from the trilemma
because of its theoretical grounding and its simplicity.4
These three variables form the basis of our analysis. In what follows we look at and
compare the international macroeconomic policy outcomes in China, and in developing
and emerging economies.5 We do this by examining the evolution of the three variables
in the trilemma space: exchange rate stability, ﬁnancial account openness and monetary
sovereignty. In addition, we are interested in the stability of the combination of these
outcomes. A policy combination is a point in the three dimensional space deﬁned by s, f
and m. We observe these combinations over time and, hence, we are able to calculate the
distance (vector) between subsequent points. This is a measure of stability of the mix of
international macroeconomic policies.6
In related work (Popper et al., 2011) we use the Euclidean norm as a way to reduce




(si,t − si,t−1)2 +( fi,t − fi,t−1)2 +( mi,t − mi,t−1)2,
which we then divide by
√
2 to ensure that the maximum possible value is unity.7 Higher
values of the norm point to an increase in instability (a greater distance between two
subsequent points).
Finally, in addition to the time dimension (stability) of policy combinations we explore
the cross country dimension. In other words, we measure the distance between China’s
policy combination and the policy combinations in developing and emerging economies.
We call this ‘policy distance’ (pd) and use it as a manifestation of how similar or diﬀerent
the mix of exchange rate stability, ﬁnancial account openness and monetary sovereignty
is between China and its peers. The Euclidean norm is used here too:
pdi,t =
￿
(schina,t − si,t)2 +( fchina,t − fi,t)2 +( mchina,t − mi,t)2,
where i is the developing countries group, a regional aggregate or the emerging economies
group. Again, we normalise the variable to be between zero and one.
74.2 Policy Outcomes in China
Figure 1 shows the average policy conﬁgurations for China, and for developing and emerg-
ing countries over the sample. As the ﬁgure illustrates, China indeed has been close to its
‘archetype’ of exchange rate stability, monetary sovereignty, and limited ﬁnancial open-
ness. Over the period 1984–2008, for which we have data, the average values of exchange
rate stability, ﬁnancial openness and monetary sovereignty are 0.8, 0.12 and 0.93, respec-
tively. In fact, there have been periods when China was perfectly aligned to its archetype
with complete exchange rate stability and a hermetically closed ﬁnancial account. But,
against this overall pattern, there have also been occasional exchange rate shifts and a
one-oﬀ change in ﬁnancial account policy. Table 1 shows the mean values for s, f and m,
as well as their maximum and minimum values and standard deviations. The same are
reported for n, the indicator of overall policy stability as described in the previous section.
Insert Figure 1 and Table 1 about here
Figure 2 illustrates the time variation of the key policies and the overall changes in
the trilemma outcome for China and for emerging and developing economies. As shown
in the top graph, China’s ﬁnancial account was totally closed between 1987 and 1992.
It took on a low value of 0.16 in all other years in the sample period. The exchange
rate was perfectly stable between 1987–1990 and 1995–2005. There was a low degree of
exchange rate stability before 1987, between 1991–1994 and from 2006 onwards. Financial
openness has been low, and monetary sovereignty, being a residual measure, was quite
high in all periods. Figure 2 shows that China’s variation in exchange rate stability has
been much higher than the individual variation in ﬁnancial account openness or monetary
sovereignty.8
Insert Figure 2 about here
Although a degree of instability, however small, may be traced to the exchange rate in
China, exchange rate instability is greater in other emerging and developing economies.
For these groups the variation in ﬁnancial openness is also quite high. Because the ex-
change rate by itself is not a suﬃcient indicator of changes in a country’s policy con-
ﬁguration, it is important to examine the overall stability of the set of international
macroeconomic policies rather than concentrating solely at the exchange rate regime.
8We report descriptive statistics of the norm for China, and for emerging and developing
economies in Table 1, and we also plot the norm in Figure 2. The norm’s maximum value
in China (reﬂecting high overall instability in international macroeconomic policy) was in
1995, after the renminbi’s devaluation. Another spike occurred in 1987 and again after
2006, when the renmimbi was de-pegged from the U.S. dollar. The norm is zero when
there are no year-on-year changes in any of its three components. This is the case between
1988–1990 and 1996–2005. Overall, the average value of China’s norm during the sample
period is 0.11, indicating a generally high degree of international macroeconomic policy
stability.
4.3 Policy Outcomes in Developing and Emerging Economies and their
Proximity to China
The empirical evidence presented in Figures 1 and 2, as well as in Table 1, shows that on
average international macroeconomic policy outcomes in other emerging and developing
economies have diﬀered from those exhibited in China. Developing economies have had
lower exchange rate stability (0.62) and monetary sovereignty (0.82) but greater ﬁnancial
openness (0.35), while emerging economies other than China have had an even lower ex-
change rate stability (0.43), slightly lower monetary sovereignty (0.9) and greater ﬁnancial
openness (0.38). They are further away from the China archetype and also further away
from China’s actual policy –see Figure 1. In comparison to China, the variations in ﬁnan-
cial account openness are of similar magnitude, or even higher than those in the degree of
exchange rate stability.9
Given that the numbers in the developing country group are averages covering a large
number of countries, the patterns over time are smoother with extremes tending to cancel
one another out. This is evident in the middle graph in Figure 2. Even so, a clear increase
over time in ﬁnancial account openness can be discerned. The same pattern is present in
the emerging group, shown in the bottom graph.
To provide a more detailed picture of the policy outcomes, we disaggregate the devel-
oping country group into six regions; East Asia and the Paciﬁc, Europe and Central Asia,
Latin America and the Caribbean, Middle East and North Africa, South Asia, and Sub
Saharan Africa. The Latin America and the Caribbean region has the highest degree of
9exchange rate stability and ﬁnancial openness. Correspondingly, it has the lowest degree
of monetary sovereignty. The Middle East and North Africa, South Asia and Sub Saha-
ran Africa regions all have substantial degrees of exchange rate stability. Sub Saharan
Africa also has the lowest average norm value, indicating overall policy stability. This
can probably be partly explained by the presence of Communaut´ e Fran¸ caise d’Afrique
countries.
The increase of ﬁnancial account openness over time is particularly apparent in the
Europe and Central Asia, Latin America and Caribbean, and Middle East and North
Africa regions –see Figure 3. In contrast, ﬁnancial account openness was decreasing in
East Asia and the Paciﬁc for much of the 1990s and early 2000s. From the ﬁgure it also
can be seen that the Europe and Central Asia region has experienced low exchange rate
stability, although this has been increasing since the early 1990s.
Insert Figure 3 about here
The t-tests in Table 1 indicate that, for every region and income group, individual
policy outcomes in terms of exchange rate stability, ﬁnancial openness and monetary
sovereignty are statistically diﬀerent from those of China. However, the mean norms of the
South Asia and East Asia and the Paciﬁc (excluding China) regions are not statistically
diﬀerent from China’s mean norm. That is, the combinations of policy outcomes have
exhibited a similar degree of overall stability.10
4.4 China and its Peers: ‘Policy Distance’ over Time
In this section we further explore the relationship between China’s international macroe-
conomic policies and those of other developing and emerging economies. Our measure
of how policies compare is based on the distances between the outcomes in the policy
space, as illustrated for the averages in Figure 1. This can be calculated for each year in
our sample by using the Euclidean norm, as outlined in section 4.1. Figure 4 plots the
policy distance for the developing and emerging groups, and Figure 5 does the same for
the separate regions.
Insert Figure 4 and Figure 5 about here
10It can be seen from these ﬁgures that the distance between international macroeco-
nomic policies in emerging economies and those in China has been on an upward trend.
For the overall developing country sample, the increase in the distance is more muted, but
the absolute gap between trilemma outcomes is still quite wide. It is also noteworthy that
for both emerging economies and for developing countries, there was a sharp increase in
the distance from China’s policies in 2008, at the end of the sample period.
Figure 5 presents the regional disparities. Taking the entire period, it is only in Sub
Saharan Africa that policies appear to be coming closer to those in China. For Latin
America and the Caribbean, as well as for the Middle East and North Africa, the distance
from China appears to be widening. This is also the case for South Asia, although the
absolute gap is smaller in this region.
The ﬁgure also shows that the distance from China’s policies has not uniformly and
consistently widened or narrowed. Diﬀerent time periods show diﬀerent results. It may
be seen, for example, that for East Asia and the Paciﬁc, for Europe and Central Asia and
for South Asia, there was a protracted period prior to the mid 2000s when international
macroeconomic policies were becoming more proximate to those in China. However, it also
needs to be recalled that such narrowing in trilemma outcomes could have been aﬀected
in some years by the changes in China’s actual policies relative to the China archetype
shown in Figure 2.
Table 2 displays the values of the policy distance measure over four time periods:
1984–1990, 1991–2000, 2001–2008 and 1984–2008.11 We ﬁnd that the distance between
developing countries and China rises from 0.15 in the ﬁrst period (1984–1990) to 0.24 in
the last (2001–2008), an increase of 44%. For emerging economies it goes up more steeply
from 0.23 in the ﬁrst period to 0.39 in the last, an increase of 50%.
These results suggest that, consistent with Figure 5, the Latin America and Caribbean,
Middle East and North Africa and South Asia regions adopt policy conﬁgurations that
are increasingly diﬀerent from China’s. Europe and Central Asia appears to be getting
closer but the initial policy distance (in the period 1984–1990) is substantial (the highest
compared to all other regional policy distances during the same period). Overall, the
South Asia and Sub Saharan Africa regions are closest to China over the entire period.12
Insert Table 2 about here
115 Concluding Remarks
The idea of a Beijing Consensus has been widely discussed but remains ill deﬁned. To some,
it means a consensus amongst developing countries about an entire range of microeconomic
and macroeconomic policies. To others, it refers to a consensus about the superiority of a
gradualist approach to economic reform. To still others, it implies a consensus around the
advantages of export led growth and reserve accumulation. It has even been interpreted
to mean a consensus around China’s proposals for international monetary reform based
on the Special Drawing Right.
In this article we have empirically examined one speciﬁc and tightly deﬁned aspect
of the Beijing Consensus. Within an analytical framework provided by the impossible
trinity or trilemma, we have investigated the extent to which developing and emerging
economies have adopted a trilemma outcome, in terms of the combination of exchange rate
policy, ﬁnancial openness and monetary independence, that is close to ‘what China does’.
Have emerging and developing economies exhibited a similar combination of international
macroeconomic policies to China?
Unsurprisingly, and perhaps reassuringly, we ﬁnd that China indeed generally has been
close to the conventional view of what may be characterized as the ‘China archetype’ of
exchange rate stability, closed ﬁnancial markets and monetary independence. However,
for both the group of emerging economies (excluding China) and developing countries in
general, exchange rates have tended to be less stable than in China, and there has been
a greater degree of ﬁnancial openness and less monetary independence. If anything, and
for emerging economies in particular, the gap between what they do and what China does
has been widening. We also ﬁnd that there are signiﬁcant regional disparities, with the
greatest proximity to China’s international macroeconomic policies being found in Sub
Saharan Africa and South Asia. In general, however, the empirical evidence we present
suggests that the idea of a Beijing Consensus existing in practice throughout the developing
world in terms of exchange rate policy, ﬁnancial openness and monetary independence is
misplaced, and perhaps increasingly so.
Of course, as China develops, it may itself change what it does in terms of interna-
tional macroeconomic policy, with these changes leading it further away from the China
archetype. Our data reveal periods of policy change in China, particularly between 1990
12and 1996. Advanced economy trilemma conﬁgurations generally involve greater exchange
rate ﬂexibility and ﬁnancial openness. The question remains as to whether China will
move in this direction, and how far and how fast it will move. It would be unsafe to
assume that changes in the trilemma outcome are driven solely, or even largely, by the
stage of economic development. Other factors - political, social and cultural, as well as
economic - may exert a signiﬁcant inﬂuence; China may yet exhibit a diﬀerent pattern of
development.
Having said this, if China is committed to establishing the renminbi as an international
currency and to having it included as part of the basket of currencies upon which the Spe-
cial Drawing Right is valued - and there are some indications that it is so committed - there
will be pressures on China to change what it does in terms of international macroeconomic
policy. In these circumstances, a time may arrive when not even China subscribes to the
contemporary notion of the Beijing Consensus. For the time being, and for the short to
medium future, however, what China does in terms of international macroeconomic policy
seems to diﬀer signiﬁcantly from what is done in the rest of the developing world. The
‘China archetype’ oﬀers an apt description of what China currently does, but not of what
other emerging and developing countries do.
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1See Mundell (1963). The term trilemma was ﬁrst coined in Obstfeld and Taylor (1997).
2Obstfeld et al. (2005) provide evidence that the trilemma is “borne out by history” using more than
130 years of data. Others have argued that some degree of monetary autonomy can be achieved under a
ﬂoating rate –see Calvo and Reinhart (2002).
3In practice, some countries do not take advantage of the full extent of exchange rate stability, ﬁnancial
openness, and monetary sovereignty that might be achievable –that is, in some cases, the trilemma does
not bind. Indeed, some countries have such low levels of exchange rate stability and ﬁnancial openness (s
and f) that, by simple arithmetic, the implicit measure of monetary sovereignty might exceed one. Because
a value of one indicates complete monetary sovereignty, we truncate the monetary sovereignty measure at
one.
4Other measures that have been frequently used in the literature are based on interest rate correla-
tions between a home and a base country –see Shambaugh (2004). Such measures unfortunately conﬂate
monetary dependence with a high incidence of shocks that are common to both countries.
5Developing economies are those classiﬁed as lower income or middle income (excluding China) by the
World Bank using 2009 data. Emerging economies are these in the Morgan Stanley Capital International
emerging markets index (again excluding China).
6As mentioned in section 3, countries can choose ‘intermediate’ policies, i.e. they can partially meet
each objective and do not necessarily have to choose corner solutions. Indeed, the data show that this
intermediate case is the overwhelming majority.
7From the Pythagorean theorem, the maximum distance between two points in a three-dimensional
space where each coordinate can assume a maximum value of one is
√
2.
8Glick and Hutchison (2009) report that, in recent years, China has been facing “large and growing”
international capital ﬂows, especially foreign direct investment. They investigate the implications of the
trilemma for domestic inﬂation.
9Note that the reported standard deviations are not the average of the countries’ standard deviations
of ﬁnancial openness in each sample, but rather the standard deviation of all observations pooled together.
The average standard deviation is lower than the number reported but still substantially higher than
China’s: twice larger in developing economies (0.154) and three times larger in emerging economies (0.213).
10If the Beijing Consensus were to be deﬁned in terms of the stability of overall international macroeco-
nomic policy rather than its composition, then South Asia and East Asia and the Paciﬁc come closest to
doing what China does.
11The policy distance measure is calculated at the means of s, f and m, i.e. the formula is pdchina,i =
p
(¯ schina − ¯ si)2 +(¯ fchina − ¯ fi)2 +(¯ mchina − ¯ mi)2, normalised to be between zero and one.
12Values of the policy distance measure for individual countries are not provided in this paper but are
available from the authors.
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21Table 1: The Trilemma Components –Descriptive statistics
Mean Max. Min. St. Dev. Obs. H0
China
s 0.80 1.00 0.08 0.30 25 –
f 0.12 0.16 0.00 0.07 25 –
m 0.93 1.00 0.84 0.08 25 –
n 0.11 0.66 0.00 0.19 24 –
Developing Economies
s 0.62 1.00 0.01 0.35 3018 −29.3***
f 0.35 1.00 0.00 0.31 2900 38.8***
m 0.83 1.00 0.00 0.27 2854 −21.1***
n 0.11 0.94 0.00 0.14 2817 −2.4**
Emerging Economies
s 0.43 1.00 0.02 0.25 482 −32.8***
f 0.38 1.00 0.00 0.32 447 17.0***
m 0.90 1.00 0.00 0.21 447 −2.7***
n 0.13 0.88 0.00 0.14 443 −2.6***
Regional Breakdown of Developing Economies (Low and Middle Income)
E. Asia & Pac.
s 0.54 1.00 0.02 0.30 410 −17.5***
f 0.41 1.00 0.00 0.32 367 17.7***
m 0.84 1.00 0.00 0.28 366 −6.1***
n 0.12 0.72 0.00 0.14 360 0.96
Eur. & C. Asia
s 0.41 1.00 0.01 0.28 272 −22.7***
f 0.35 1.00 0.00 0.32 245 11.3***
m 0.90 1.00 0.00 0.18 228 −2.3**
n 0.14 0.70 0.00 0.13 213 3.1***
Lat. Amer. & Carib.
s 0.69 1.00 0.01 0.34 723 −8.8***
f 0.45 1.00 0.00 0.35 719 25.4***
m 0.72 1.00 0.00 0.32 717 −17.0***
n 0.12 0.94 0.00 0.17 713 1.9*
Mid. East & N. Africa
s 0.67 1.00 0.01 0.33 291 −7.0***
f 0.39 1.00 0.00 0.38 283 11.8***
m 0.75 1.00 0.00 0.38 278 −7.8***
n 0.10 0.88 0.00 0.15 275 −1.8*
S. Asia
s 0.67 1.00 0.04 0.29 197 −6.4***
f 0.27 1.00 0.00 0.26 191 7.8***
m 0.89 1.00 0.00 0.25 189 −2.5**
n 0.11 0.61 0.00 0.14 186 0.1
Sub-Sah. Africa
s 0.62 1.00 0.01 0.37 1125 −16.2***
f 0.26 1.00 0.00 0.24 1095 19.0***
m 0.88 1.00 0.00 0.14 1076 −11.3***
n 0.08 0.76 0.00 0.12 1070 −7.6***
Notes: The last column reports the value of the t-statistic for a test of equality of each region’s
mean exchange rate stability s, ﬁnancial openness f, monetary sovereignty m and norm n against
China’s respective means. (*) denotes signiﬁcance at the 10% level; (**) at the 5% level; (***) at
the 1% level.
22Table 2: Policy Distance from China
1984–1990 1991–2000 2001–2008 1984–2008
Developing Econ. 0.15 0.22 0.24 0.21
Emerging Econ. 0.23 0.28 0.39 0.30
Regional Breakdown of Developing Economies (Low and Middle Income)
E. Asia & Pac. 0.26 0.29 0.24 0.27
Eur. & C. Asia 0.33 0.35 0.26 0.30
Lat. Amer. & Carib. 0.13 0.27 0.39 0.27
Mid. East & N. Afr. 0.17 0.22 0.32 0.23
S. Asia 0.10 0.15 0.17 0.13
Sub-Sah. Africa 0.15 0.17 0.15 0.15
Notes: Policy distance is a metric revealing the extent of the disparity in policy conﬁgurations
between an income group (or region) and China. It is measured as
pdchina,i =
￿
(¯ schina − ¯ si)2 +(¯ fchina − ¯ fi)2 +(¯ mchina − ¯ mi)2.
23